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ABSTRACT
As software becomes more ubiquitous, and the risk of cyber-crimes
increases, ensuring that software systems are forensic-ready (i.e.,
capable of supporting potential digital investigations) is critical.
However, little or no attention has been given to how well-suited
existing software engineering methodologies and practices are for
the systematic development of such systems. In this paper, we con-
sider the meaning of forensic readiness of software, define forensic
readiness requirements, and highlight some of the open software
engineering challenges in the face of forensic readiness. We use
a real software system developed to investigate online sharing of
child abuse media to illustrate the presented concepts.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Software and its engineering→ Requirements analysis; • Ap-
plied computing→ Evidence collection, storage and analysis;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Forensic readiness represents the capability of an organization to
support digital investigations proactively, i.e., before an incident
occurs [24]. It is realized through the production of evidence that
(i) facilitates the investigation and demonstration of compliance
to organizational and regulatory policies, and (ii) can support le-
gal proceedings [9]. To date, however, researchers’ attention has
been geared towards the provision of general guidelines that could
potentially enhance organizations’ operational and infrastructural
capabilities to achieve forensic readiness. Little or no attention has
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been given to how the software systems deployed within these or-
ganizations can be designed to be themselves forensic-ready. With
a rapid rise in cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime—number of
identity theft incidents increased by 222% in 2016 [7] whilst on-
line child sexual exploitation increased by 135% in 2016 [21]—there
is an urgent need to consider what forensic readiness means for
software systems and how such readiness can be incorporated as
part of software development processes. Work in this area is either
very preliminary or has been limited to specific aspects of foren-
sic readiness, such as ensuring that evidence relevant to potential
incidents is preserved [3, 17, 19] or that evidence integrity is main-
tained [16]. No work to date has considered the wider potential or
implication of rigorous software engineering on the development
of forensic-ready systems.
Our vision is to investigate the notion of forensic readiness in
software systems and understand how forensic-ready software sys-
tems can be developed systematically. To achieve this vision we
investigate forensic readiness requirements over software systems
and assumptions over their encompassing environment. Require-
ments and assumptions can be used to derive implementable soft-
ware specifications that achieve forensic readiness. Some of these
requirements are data-centred, aimed to ensure availability, rele-
vance, minimality, non-repudiation, completeness, and linkability
of data. Others are process-centred, aimed to ensure that the pro-
cess through which the software system performs digital forensic
activities is sound. We elicit forensic readiness requirements by re-
viewing existing literature and examining a real world investigative
toolkit, iCOP [20], which was designed with the purpose of facili-
tating investigations of online child abuse media shared throguh
P2P networks. Finally, we present open research challenges that
relate to different aspects of engineering forensic-ready software
systems and that consider how such systems can operate within
emerging cyber-physical environments.
2 SOFTWARE FORENSIC READINESS
Although forensic readiness is a notion that is not new in the con-
text of digital forensics, what it means and how it is conceptualised,
differs amongst researchers, e.g., [11, 22, 24, 27]. In this paper, we
are interested in what forensic readiness means for software en-
gineering practices. At the heart of digital forensic readiness is
the digital data, including the media and the activity logs avail-
able within an organization’s information system network, or on
users’ devices. These data could hold valuable information about
how a particular incident occurred and by whom, potentially re-
sulting in a successful prosecution of the perpetrator [5, 13]. In this
context, forensic readiness of system network or devices implies
maximal usefulness of the data held as potential digital evidence
admissible in court. Such usefulness can only be attained if the data
and the process through which they are acquired, analysed and
stored is forensically sound. (A forensically sound process is one that
maximizes the evidentiary weight of digital evidence [18], whilst
forensically sound evidence is one that can endure legal scrutiny in
a court of law [10].) We take the view that forensic readiness in the
context of software engineering is a property that encapsulates the
capabilities of software to: (1) conduct digital forensic processes in a
forensically sound way; and (2) produce forensically sound evidence.
As we are concerned with developing software that ensures foren-
sic soundness of data and processes, prior to the occurrence of an
incident or attack, such capabilities must be proactive. Furthermore,
we consider forensic readiness to be a property that is achievable
either partially or fully, depending on the software capabilities, and
is with respect to a set of speculated incidents that an organization
has identified and assessed as critical.
3 MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
To provide a sense of our envisaged research direction and chal-
lenges to overcome, we discuss the iCOP toolkit [20]. This has
the main purpose of identifying, preserving and analysing new
or previously unknown child sexual abuse (CSA) media shared by
suspects on peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. As shown in Figure 1,
iCOP has two major components: the P2P Engine and the Analysis
Engine. The P2P engine monitors information (e.g., IP addresses,
filenames and hash values of files) together with metadata (e.g.,
when a user was last seen sharing a file) from public traffic on
P2P networks. This information is passed on to the Analysis En-
gine, which compares the monitored hash values to a list of known
hashes of CSA media seized by law enforcement. This allows the
system to disregard CSA media already known to law enforcement.
The file names that do not occur in the known hash lists are then
analysed to assess their likelihood of containing CSA media. File-
names flagged as suspicious are passed back to the P2P Engine for
downloading. The content of the downloaded files is subsequently
analysed automatically by a Media Analysis module to determine
whether the files contain child abuse material. Finally, the resulting
list of suspicious new or previously unknown files is examined by
investigators to confirm whether they contain child abuse images
and videos. Once confirmed, these items are fed back into the hash
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Figure 1: Overview of the iCOP toolkit
We aim to explore new software engineering methodologies and
techniques for the design of software systems capable of supporting
digital investigations proactively. In what follows, we consider the
key requirements that software systems must satisfy and illustrate
such requirements using the iCOP toolkit.
4 FORENSIC READINESS REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we describe a preliminary set of requirements for
forensic-ready systems that were elicited by reviewing existing
literature on forensic readiness. We discuss the requirements in the
context of the iCOP toolkit. We also distinguish between require-
ments that are data-centred and others that are process-centred.
Availability. Data that may be useful for investigating potential
incidents should be available [24, 27]. To achieve availability, data
that may provide investigative clues must be preserved and re-
trievable by law enforcement agencies or individuals who are in
charge of conducting an investigation. As data may not be kept in
non-volatile memories (e.g., network traffic) and physical devices
can have limitations (e.g., damaged hard drives), the capability to
preserve data proactively must be in place. Preservation can be trig-
gered by changes in the data to be collected [25], can be performed
periodically [30] or for a limited amount of time [14], in order not
to consume resources (e.g., battery power in a mobile device). To
facilitate retrieval of preserved data, metadata should also be stored.
In the context of the iCOP toolkit, data that can be useful to in-
vestigate incidents can be video and image files indicating a new
child abuse and information about the users sharing CSA media
(e.g., IP address, client ID). However, not all files can be preserved
successfully because downloads are often slow and they stall if the
computers sharing the file go off-line. To facilitate retrieval of such
data, CSA related material, P2P network users and victims should
be identified unambiguously. This is challenging because often the
same CSA material is shared under different filenames and victims
can appear in different files.
Relevance. Data preserved proactively should be relevant to po-
tential incident cases [28]. Relevance of data means whether data
is able to support or refute hypotheses explaining how incidents
occurred [3]. Ensuring relevance of preserved data allows an or-
ganization to have the data preservation activities more targeted
on the risks to the business [24]. Relevance can be subject to the
judgement of an investigator [26] and is typically determined by the
files and data types available [12, 23] (e.g., email addresses, message
information, date and time information, cookies, social security
and credit card numbers from a computer hard disk image). In our
example, to satisfy the relevance requirement, iCOP should ensure
that stored CSA media is of new material or previously unknown.
This is challenging because analysing the content of any file shared
on the P2P network is not computationally tractable. The iCOP
toolkit uses textual features of the filenames and characteristics of
the users sharing the files (e.g., users sharing the greatest number
of suspected files or sharing the greatest number of files) to identify
CSA related media. However, files that do not contain any textual
clues to their illegal content -which otherwise is relevant data - or
that are shared by new users may not be preserved.
Minimality. Data preserved proactively should not include any
information that is unnecessary for the purpose of an investigation.
Satisfaction of this goal can have the side-effect of reducing the
amount of resources that are spent looking for digital evidence and,
therefore, the costs of an investigation [27]. In our case study, to
satisfy the minimality goal, the iCOP toolkit should not preserve
files that do not refer to a child abuse case (false positives). A
typical false positive error can be when webcam videos showing a
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child without any adult interaction are considered as CSA material.
Satisfaction of the minimality goal highly depends on the type of
data to be preserved; in our example, considering the difficulty of
recognising CSA content, the minimality goal cannot be fully met.
Linkability. Preserved data should be linkable with other pieces
of evidence, such as other evidence and witness statements. This
is very important to reconstruct how an incident took place when
heterogeneous data are preserved, as it allows creating cause-effect
relations between incident activities indicated by different evi-
dences [24]. In the iCOP toolkit, ensuring linkability between media
sharing is important to identify an individual sharing specific con-
tent uniquely. A connection is assumed to be a single user sharing
a given set of files from a specific location. Storing the IP and the
geolocation information (GUID), an investigator can easily view
which connections are related via a common IP address or GUID.
Additionally, all files that are confirmed to contain CSA content
can be used by police investigators to identify unknown victims.
Completeness. Preserved data should be sufficient to satisfy or
refute an incident hypothesis. Satisfaction of this goal depends on
the scope of an investigation, i.e. the portion of the environment
in which an incident is assumed to have happened. For example,
the scope of an investigation may be enlarged to include additional
digital sources which can provide information about the location of
new sources of evidence that may be relevant for the incident [15].
To satisfy the completeness goal, the iCOP toolkit should ensure
preservation of any media related to child abuse that is shared on
P2P networks. Currently the scope of the iCOP toolkit is limited to
the Gnutella file sharing network and other P2P networks or social
media are not considered. Achieving completeness requires making
assumptions on the boundary of the investigation; this goal would
be impossible to achieve if this boundary is not fixed.
Non-Repudiation. Preserved data should constitute an evidence
that is admissible legally and should be accepted in a court of law [8].
To achieve this goal preserved data should satisfy the integrity
requirement, i.e. they should not be tampered from the time of
acquisition until its final disposition [24, 27]. Preserved data should
provide high assurances about their authenticity; for example, only
specific trusted parties should be authorised to access it [24]. The
chain of custody of data should also be maintained [24]. This means
that all changes in the control, handling, possession, ownership
or custody of a piece of evidence should be documented. In our
example, iCOP should ensure that preserved CSA content can only
be accessed by police investigators in possession of login credentials.
Moreover it should provide techniques to assess authenticity of
media files and maintain their chain of custody. Additional tools
and procedures to satisfy these requirements must be adopted by
the individual law enforcement agencies.
Data provenance. The process adopted to preserve data should
record when, how and by whom such data is originated, moved and
modified over time. The Transparent Computing1 program encour-
ages provenance of system components to identify relationships
between system activities [6] that may be related to a cyber threat.
As provenance information can grow over time it is also necessary
to summarise such information meaningfully [2]. In our example,
data provenance can refer to preservation of files meta-data (e.g.,
1https://www.darpa.mil/program/transparent-computing
creation date) that provide more information about multiple abuses
of the same victim over time. Data about the P2P users can also
support identification of new users sharing CSA material.
Legal compliance. The process adopted to preserve data should
ensure compliance with existing regulations, which may vary de-
pending on the jurisdiction(s) in which an incident may occur. Iden-
tification of what regulations apply to a specific system depends
on the nationality and the physical location of the data subject, as
well as the physical location of the organization collecting data.
For example, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)2 in
Europe and the Fourth Amendement in USA [1] regulate what data
can be preserved and under which conditions (privacy). The EU
Data Retention Directive, can prescribe for how long data should
be retained (retention). The GDPR also prescribes for how long data
be accessed and by whom (access to retained data). For the iCOP
case study, media files can be preserved in UK because they are
“voluntarily” shared to third parties but this would not apply in
other European countries, such as Belgium. Any monitoring and
downloading of CSA media can only take place at suitable law
enforcement premises and access to CSA material is only given to
police investigators, in order to ensure privacy of victims’ identities.
5 SOFTWARE ENGINEERING CHALLENGES
We elicit a number of open software engineering challenges.
1. Representing and reasoning about forensic-ready systems.
We have presented a first conceptualization of forensic readiness
requirements of software systems. There is a need to build a con-
sensus around the key characteristics of forensic-ready software
systems. We can divide the implications and challenges into three
sub-categories: (i) concept (how to represent and reason about
forensic-ready systems and their properties), (ii) method (how to
design and implement forensic-ready systems), and (iii) tools (how
to analyse and support the development of forensic-ready systems).
Existing work on concepts and taxonomy of dependability [4] could
be a useful reference model to extend to forensic readiness. Such
characterization would facilitate a better understanding of the po-
tential relationship between forensic-ready requirements and other
types of requirements such as security, privacy and safety. Fur-
thermore, there is a need to characterise forensic-ready systems
formally. This requires identifying formal languages —if any— that
are best suited to express forensic readiness requirements, and will
allow us to understand the extent to which existing representation
and reasoning techniques are applicable to forensic-ready systems.
2. Methods for engineering forensic-ready software systems.
The notion of forensic readiness poses challenging questions for
software engineering methods and particularly how should exist-
ing methods adapt to account for forensic readiness requirements.
Research is needed to answer a number of fundamental questions
related to how requirements for forensic-ready systems should be
implemented and whether these requirements are solely about data
preservation activities. Architectural patterns (similar to security
patterns [29]) could also be investigated to design forensic-ready
systems. Additional challenges relate to managing trade-offs be-
tween forensic readiness requirements such as privacy and avail-
ability given that some of these could manifest at runtime. For
2Regulation (EU) 2016/679
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example, privacy may prevent the system from preserving relevant
evidence and depends on the country in which an investigation
is conducted. Ensuring security of forensic-ready systems is also
important. For example, analysis of media files in the iCOP toolkit
should avoid malware execution and the criteria adopted by iCOP
to decide when a file must be downloaded should be confidential.
3. Verification of forensic readiness requirements.A key chal-
lenge is verifying that existing software systems satisfy forensic
readiness requirements. Research questions relate to whether these
requirements require development of different verification tech-
niques compared to those adopted to verify safety and security
properties and whether satisfaction of forensic readiness require-
ments can be guaranteed at design time. Our analysis of the iCOP
system demonstrates that satisfaction of forensic readiness require-
ments cannot be blanket and trade-offs arise from the interaction of
forensic readiness requirements with properties of the environment
or various (human or software) agents and investigative processes
that interface with a software system. There are also interesting
challenges with regards to impact on other functionality of the
system, for instance, ensuring that runtime forensic processes are
not intrusive and disruptive of normal system functions.
4. Technological developments. Perhaps the wicked problem
posed for forensic readiness is the one arising from the increasing
deployment of Internet of Things (IoT) devices—and the software
embedded within these devices—in everyday settings. In such smart
cyber-physical environments, the system design cannot be antic-
ipated a-priori and is only emergent a-posteriori when various
IoT devices dynamically compose to deliver various services. Even
more critically this emergent design is volatile in that the system
configuration—and the devices engaged—may change on a regular
basis. An example of this is a user with wearables walking through
a smart city environment with various devices coming in and out
of range and interfacing with each other. Such a dynamically aggre-
gated environment poses major challenges for forensic readiness
of software systems – how are the goals of availability, relevance,
non-repudiation, legal compliance, completeness, minimality, and
linkability impacted in such a setting is a non-trivial question to be
addressed by software engineering research.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigated the notion of forensic readiness in
software systems and the requirements that support its attainment,
highlighting some of the open software engineering challenges. For
future work we plan to provide a formal characterization of forensic
readiness requirements. We will also explore techniques for ana-
lyzing tradeoffs between conflicting requirements. Finally we will
investigate aspects related to the implementation of a forensic-ready
system, such as the generation of specification for such systems or
assessment of relevance of preserved data.
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